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Performance-Based Launch Services Contracts: Better, Faster, Cheaper?
INTRODUCTION
     Services comprise approximately fifty percent of what the Government buys, and with dwindling
budgets and increasing costs, many recent reform initiatives have centered on using more commercial
practices to obtain these needed services more effectively and efficiently.  One of the most important of
these initiatives is the use of performance-based acquisition strategies for services.  Dr. Jacques Gansler,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology established a goal for DOD to have, at a
minimum, fifty percent of service acquisitions, measured in both dollars and actions, to be performance-
based by the year 2005.  Deputy Secretary of Department of Transportation (DOT), Mortimer Downey,
set DOT’s goal at eighty percent by end of FY 2004 for contract actions to meet the criteria of
performance-based service contracting.  Similar goals have been established by NASA.  The hopes are for
significant savings and greater customer satisfaction though performance gains in timeliness, quality, and
productivity.
DEFINITION
     Performance-based contracting means structuring all aspects of an acquisition around the purpose or
results of the work to be performed as opposed to dictating the manner by which the work is to be
performed via detailed specifications or requiring only a level of effort against broad and imprecise
statements of work for a term of time.  It emphasizes objective, measurable, unambiguous performance
tasks preferably against international, commercially available standards (i.e. in terms of quality,
timeliness, quantity, etc) incorporated into the statements of work; quality assurance surveillance plans;
and specific procedures for reductions of fee or price when services are not performed or do not meet
contract requirements.  In addition to these basic requirements, contracts may also include positive
incentives for performance exceeding the minimum standard, wherever appropriate.
     In summary, performance-based contracting should articulate clear, measurable requirements
emphasizing quantifiable outcomes, with compensation based on performance measured against those
outcomes, and integrated with a quality assurance surveillance plan describing how suppliers’
performance will be evaluated against those measurable requirements.  This allows offerors maximum
flexibility to attain the greatest degree of innovation and creativity.  This should also result in reduced
compliance requirements, reduced reporting, and government insight in lieu of oversight.
     Too often, the Government has contracted for services that, in fact, limit the scope of innovation
offerors can bring to the process.  This means more care must be used in selecting contractors,
determining contract type and incentives.  It also means a change in the way the Government has to
perform contract administration.  Since the Government has put more of the responsibility on the
contractor to ensure completed performance of a specific goal versus his best level-of-effort towards a
broad goal, the roles of both the Government and the contractor have changed.   Performance must be
within contractor’s management prerogative.
GUIDANCE
     The National Performance Review, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and the
Chief Financial Officer’s Act of 1990, have all established goals implementing principles of streamlining
and innovation to in order to achieve more effective and efficient management of the Government’s
resources.
     Performance-based service contracts are a revolutionary way of doing business within the Federal
Government.  Due to the extremely experimental nature of the business of some of the agencies within the
Federal Government (DOD, NASA, DARPA, DOT, DOE) up until now there has seemingly been no
other way of doing business than to dictate the detail of “how to” reach our stated needs.  The mindset has
been that we, the customer, know exactly how a needed product should be manufactured and we assume
the manufacturer does not know how to manufacture it.  If the manufacturer knows how to make the
product, we may be missing an opportunity by limiting the possibility of obtaining an improved, less
costly, or more reliable product because we have constrained the ability of the manufacturer to be
innovative.  In the case of commodaties, as the commercial marketplace has expanded across the world
and with the advent of electronic commerce, it has become much easier to find like and similar products
that fit our needs.  When we look at the acquisition of services, it is more difficult to define what the
product is and measure our satisfaction with it.  When the services are to support rocket launches the task
becomes even more difficult.  The key to the performance approach is to not state the methods for
achieving the results but to state objective, measurable performance requirements and quality standards.
     The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued “A Guide to Best Practices for Performance-
Based Service Contracting” in October 1998 (final edition).  This document is neither mandatory
regulatory guidance, nor is it intended to serve as a detailed “how to” manual.  Comparisons done, for the
purposes of this technical paper, between the OFPP guide and existing performance-based service
contracts are done for the purpose of analysis and illustration only for this forum as an educational tool.
PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE CONTRACTING (PBSC) CHECKLIST
Minimum Mandatory PBSC Requirements
1. Performance requirements that define the work in measurable, mission-related terms.
2. Performance standards (i.e. quality, quantity, timeliness) tied to the performance requirements.
3. A Government quality assurance (QA) plan that describes how the contractor’s performance will be
measured against the performance standards.
4. If the acquisition is either critical to agency mission accomplishment or requires relatively large
expenditure of funds, positive and negative incentives tied to the Government QA plan, and
incentives.  PBSC encourages and enables the increased use of fixed-price contracts and incentives to
encourage optimal performance. Cost reimbursement contracts should include specific incentive
provisions in addition to the award fee to insure that contractors are rewarded for good perforamnce,
as well as quality assurance deduction schedules to assure satisfactory performance.
Additional PBSC Components
5. An historic workload analysis is performed, or the workload is estimated if historic data is
unavailable, to aid in determining the performance requirements and standards, Government QA plan,
and incentives.
6. The solicitation and contract/task order convey a logical, easily understood flow among performance
requirements, performance standards, Government QA, and performance incentives.
7. Process-oriented requirements (e.g. job descriptions, education requirements, level-of-effort) and
reports are eliminated to the maximum feasible extent.
8. Government QA performance evaluators assigned to assess contractor performance are trained in
PBSC.
9. Commercial and/or industry-wide performance standards, where available, are relied upon.
10. The marketplace and other stakeholders are provided the opportunity to comment on draft
performance requirements and standards, the Government QA plan, and performance incentives.
11. If the size of the requirement justifies the resource expenditures, potential offerors are given the
opportunity to learn more about the “as is” operation to facilitate their ability to develop intelligent
proposals.
RESULTS
     In October 1996, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), a division of OMB, initiated a
performance-based service contracting (PBSC) Government-wide pilot program.  Agencies designated
non-PBSC contracts that were due to expire, and re-solicited them using PBSC methods.  Twenty-six
contracts, ranging in amount from $100,000 to $325 million, from 15 agencies with a combined award
value of approximately $585 million were included in this project.  The participating contracts
experienced an average price decrease of 15 percent in nominal dollars and improvement in customer
satisfaction with contractor performance of over 18 percent.  Moreover, reduced prices and increased
customer satisfaction occurred at all price ranges, for both non-technical and professional and technical
services, and whether the contract remained fixed-price or was converted from cost reimbursement to
fixed-price.  Also gained was an industry pledge to utilize conflict resolution mechanisms to avoid
protests and disputes, identify services convertible to performance-based contracting on a firm, fixed-
price (FFP) basis, work with the government to eliminate obstacles to implementing this initiative, and
identify commercial contracting practices adaptable for use by the Government.
     A December 1999 NASA Headquarters Performance-Based Contracting Assessment noted difficulty
in developing appropriate and meaningful performance standards for advanced R&D activites.  It was
also noted that while the Government does not always need to specify the “how”, it needs to understand
the contractor’s approach to ensure safety and mission success. The Joint Base Operations and Support
Contract (JBOSC) is a cost plus award fee (CPAF) contract which acquires base support for NASA’s
Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Station, Patrick Air Force Base, and certain other locations.
This contract is the first attempt to consolidate the acquisition of base support at these locations. The
JBOSC approach to developing the performance requirements and standards used a statement of
objectives technique.  That is, the Government described its needs in the solicitation, and the offerors
were invited to propose the specific implementation. The award of this first time consolidation contract
was on a CPAF basis to allow the Government to have maximum flexibility and control.  This is
somewhat controversial, since control in not in line with the concept of PBSC.   While the contract is
CPAF, the prime contractor is already writing fixed-price subcontracts to the maximum extent
practicable.  The contractor has identified other areas that are candidates for FFP. The following are some
of the findings by NASA Headquarters on JBOSC:
1. The contractor has to conform to multiple accounting practices and multiple levels of detail
2. The Government’s continuously unexpected requests for additional contractor-generated data to
justify spending priorities and additional budget justification added to the cost of doing business
3. The continued use of policy and guidance requiring Government involvement in approvals in
direct conflict with the responsibility contractually given to the contractor
4. Performance standards were not directly linked to the award fee and in effect, contractor
performance is measured objectively, and assessed subjectively
5. The highly subjective award fee plan was written at a very high level
6. The surveillance plan was written at an extraordinarily high level which did not enumerate the
specific surveillance tools and processes that are employed.
     Recommendations included:
1. Identification and use of a single appropriated level of reporting and attempt to reduce the number
of data calls
2. Performance of a risk assessment of contractor activities to develop a structured approach to
surveillance and revision of the surveillance plan accordingly
3. Monitoring of contractor performance for the right opportunity to convert significant portions of
the contract to FFP
4. Conversion of some of the award fee into an objective incentive fee structure.
5. Because each affected agency, i.e. NASA, Air Force and Navy, has a unique organizational
culture, sometimes divergent, there is a need to manage the contract in a manner that is acceptable
to all of the agencies.
     Both agencies anticipated a cost savings of twenty to thirty percent from the JBOSC.  Initially, the
consolidation of services to support the Air Force and NASA into one contract, the JBOSC, resulted in
several hundred less jobs being contracted for versus the previous separate contracts.  Analysis by the
JBOSC Joint Performance Management Office (JPMO) to account for the projected savings revealed that:
1. The contractor under-estimated his costs (as was recognized in the Most Probable Cost analysis
done by the Source Selection Board) and recognized contractually by modification
2. Requirements increased which were not included in the budget
3. Government budget projections were too low due to reliance on reimbursable work which not
realized
4. There was an excess projection of funding from other agencies
5. There was sharing in overheads not previously shared
6. Labor rates increased as a result of combining consolidated bargaining agreements between
agencies where pay differentials had existed
7. Unanticipated costs resulted from the initiative to stop providing general purpose vehicles and
maintenance of them and require contractor to lease them.
     Another initiative of the JBOSC was to establish a means of promoting, advertising and ensuring
customer feedback on the satisfaction of the performance of the JBOSC contractor.  An electronic site
was established for this purpose.  The JPMO has received numerous customer feedback responses.  To
date, customer satisfaction has been generally above an average of around 95% measured on product,
process, interface and overall satisfaction.
     A 10 March 2000 Inspector General report on the DOD titled “Contracts for Professional,
Administrative and Management Support Services” (D-2000-100) said that DOD service contracts are
riddled with errors from bad cost estimates to weak technical reviews to a lack of competition among
bidders.  Errors were found on every contract reviewed.  It was concluded that the errors are widespread
because DOD acquisition professionals are overworked and don’t have enough training in good
contracting practices.  Further, there is inexperience in writing performance-based statements of work,
cultural inertia, and concerns about more open and interactive communication with industry throughout
the acquisition process.
LESSONS LEARNED
     A September 1998 self-evaluation of lessons learned by the JBOSC Source Evaluation Board relays a
message about the importance of choosing the right people when doing a source selection.  Members
were asked to leave attitudes behind and arrive with the willingness to see the other point of view and to
work out differences.  They must be assigned full time and not as an additional duty.  Giving up this type
of valuable person to a temporary assignment is a painful sacrifice for any parent organization.  Members
should not be assigned that cannot devote their full effort to the tasks – part time members attempting to
function in their past capacity are disruptive to team efforts and hinder project/tasks completion.  Once
assigned, it is difficult to understand the “language” and philosphies of the two cultures.  Every area of
service had its own differences, for example construction and security.
     A self-evaluation of lessons learned by the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) program relays
the following messages:
1. Taking an existing contract to a performance contract with the same budget is difficult
because the perception by bidders is that something extra is being asked for
2. The contractor will want to remove as much content as possible, while the government wants
work content to remain and efficiencies realized.
3. Periods of performance should line up with pre-existing major contracts in order to aid
potential future Government-owned Contractor-operated (GOCO) transition efforts or
additional contractor consolidations.  If the option years start and stop at the same time, then
lining up all affected contracts for a GOCO starting point if easier.
4. Take advantage of the available computer systems and networks to optimize the
development, review, control, and maintenance of the acquisition documents.  Use these
systems to effectively communicate actions, schedule and progress with board members,
management, industry, etc.
5. State your requirements in the form of desired output; not wants, but valid needs, and avoid
“how to”.
6. Providing morning status reports or performing tasks that government personnel can do for
themselves are not valid contracting requirements.  “Go-fer” tasks are not requirements and
should be discouraged for Performance Based Contracting.
7. Government Agency or Center specific standard and specifications should not be copied from
previous contracts and dumped in without adequate screening.  Many of these standards and
specs are “how to” documents.  Take time to examine applicable documents, put how-to’s in
reference document lists only, and identify that type of document back to the OPR to allow
them the opportunity to revise.
8. Spend a lot of time and effort up front to select the verbiage and desired outputs in
performance based terms/measures and avoid “how to” and the RFP/SOW will be much
smaller.
9. Do not let existing or future organizations or financial reporting schemes dictate the shape of
the WBS/SOW.  Think “out of the box” and pursue a process or work-based approach.
10. Aggressively challenge and validate higher level requirements because of their influence on
award fee.
11. Empower the contractor, transfer of a greater share of the risk, and hold the contractor
accountable.
12. Because of the contractor giving accountability back to the government while you are paying
them to be accountable.  The contractor will readily agree to the government’s reviewing and
approving their plans and procedures, both technical and administrative.
13. Assure yourselves that management is ready for PBC because it requires a different
management concept than our traditional government-contractor style.  Try to minimize the
need for management assurance through civil service involvement and the requirement to
approve contractor activities rather than assess contractor performance.
14. Avoid contractor proprietary information management or technical data systems that hinder
future competition or government insight.
15. Information that the contractor does not need to do the job is most likely information the
government does not need either.  What the contractor needs should be available and
accessible to the government.  If the contractors want the government out of their business
tell them this information must be freely accessible and available in order to facilitate the
government stepping back.
16. Minimize data requirements and deliverable requiring explicit government approval and
delivery.  Limit only to information/data needed for government to make a decision upon
and/or comply to some higher level requirement that has been validated.
17. The most important lesson is to be flexible.  There is no one way to do things.  The
government is reinventing itself, and the old orthodox procurement ways are being rethought.
Each of us must be willing to learn during the process, change our ways of thinking, and
accept new ways of doing business.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Only one performance standard and process for each type of base support service required should
be used if consolidation and efficiencies are expected to reduce cost, particularly when more two
or more agencies are involved.  Only one format and level of reporting of accounting data should
be required of the contractor.  Multiple standards and processes increases cost of doing business
and opens the door for multiplicity in labor union agreements, which also increases cost.
2. It may be slow to see cost reductions for services being contracted for using PBSC methods if
CPAF type contracts are used in lieu of FFP type contracts.  Due to the extensive man-hours
required on the part of both the Government and the contractor in the administration of the award
fee process coupled with the subjectivity of the evaluation, use of award fee should be minimized.
When performance standards and their metrics are mature, metric evaluations can be tied to
positive and negative incentives allowing a more streamlined and objective evaluation process.
An incentive could be tied to obtaining the best Collective Bargaining Agreement for the
Government (for example: maximizing cross-utilization of crews, average wage rates between two
divergent existing agreements).
3. Attempts should be made before award to separate those requirements which have good historical
price data and which are of moderate risk for award as FFP portions, or separated into one FFP
contract.
4. Due to the complexity of space launch services, the lack of specific historical cost data for
comparison, the magnitude of the change in approach from level of effort term contracts with
subjective award fee to performance based completion contracts with performance standards tied
to incentives and the number of other initiatives that were incorporated, it may not be reasonable
to expect one contract to effect this change all at once.  It will most probably be a reiterative
process by which each source selection will fine-tune until a completely performance-based
launch services FFP contract with positive and negative performance incentives can be created.
SUMMARY
     Are performance-based launch services contracts better, faster and cheaper?  At this time this writer is
prepared to say yes to all of the above based mainly on professional intuition.
     In the opinion of the writer and based on the foregoing, it seems intuitive that since we have moved
more of the performance responsibility to the contractor versus the Government, that we are by definition
getting a better service.  Without a customer satisfaction rating on the previous contracts to compare with,
it is not possible to make a quantitative analysis of better based on increased customer satisfaction.
     At this time, there is not information available to the writer to determine if the services are being
offered faster, but again, intuition would predict that where services have been consolidated, just having
one contractor providing a range of electronically published services would be faster for a launch service
requester than having to deal with several contractors and multiple agencies to obtain needed services.
This is especially true for new programs just getting into operation.
     The answer to whether our performance-based launch services contracts are cheaper is much more
difficult to answer.  Again, while we might not be saving the dollars that we had projected, my intuition is
that we have gained a better and faster service, and additional services, with a decreased budget.  The size
and complexity of our launch service contracts and the lack of detailed historical data make this a difficult
question to answer.  In my professional opinion, since we are now concentrating on gathering data and
understanding our requirements more in performance-based terms, we will be laying the groundwork to
realize and account for cost benefits.  The initial gain is the emphasis by all levels of the Government and
the contractor community to strive for better, faster, cheaper.  That emphasis, in and of itself, is a step in
the right direction to the desired goal.  To ensure success we must continue to emphasize and strive for
that goal, look for ways to foster flexibility, stay informed about the successes and failures across
Government agencies and learn lessons from them.  We must stay focused on education, analysis and
implementation.  The Government must think of themselves as part of the commercial marketplace and
not a dictator to it.
